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STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Nature of the Case
After police raided his home and discovered harvested and still-growing
marijuana, Mark Beavers was charged with trafficking in marijuana and possessing
marijuana with the intent to deliver. This was the First Case. While Mr. Beavers was
out on bond awaiting trial in the First Case, he sold additional marijuana to an
undercover police officer, was arrested, and had his car and his automobile searched.
Again, police found harvested and still-growing marijuana. This time, he was charged
with delivery of marijuana, possession of marijuana with the intent to deliver, and
trafficking in marijuana. This was the Second Case.
In his two separate trials, Mr. Beavers attempted to present "necessity" defenses,
arguing that the marijuana seized in both cases was intended for his personal use and
was necessary to treat his various medical conditions.

However, his efforts in this

regard were thwarted to varying degrees by the respective district courts. Ultimately,
Mr. Beavers was found guilty of most of the charged offenses in the two cases.
At a joint sentencing hearing, the district court ruled that Mr. Beavers' sentences
in the Second Case could be enhanced based on his "prior conviction" in the First Case,
and it imposed an aggregate sentence of twelve years, with three years fixed.
On appeal, Mr. Beavers presents three distinct claims of error: (1) the district
court erred in the First Case by refusing to instruct the jury regarding the common law
defense of necessity; (2) the district court erred in the Second Case by precluding
Mr. Beavers from presenting evidence in support of a necessity defense, and by
refusing to instruct the jury on that defense; and (3) the district court erred at the joint
sentencing hearing insofar as it concluded that Mr. Beavers' sentences in the Second
1

Case could be enhanced by his "prior convictions" in the First Case, even though no
convictions had actually been entered in the First Case as of the time that Mr. Beavers
allegedly committed the offenses at issue in the Second Case. In light of these errors,
Mr. Beavers respectfully requests new trials in both cases or, in the alternative, a new
joint sentencing hearing.
In response, the State argues that, as a matter of law, the "necessity" defense is
inapplicable to any of the offenses charged in either the First Case or the Second Case
(trafficking in marijuana, delivery of marijuana, or possession of marijuana with intent to
deliver). (Respondent's Brief, pp.10, 11-15, 29.) Alternatively, it argues that, even if the
"necessity" defense is a theoretically possibility, the district courts did not err in either
case because, in the First Case, Mr. Beavers failed to offer trial evidence sufficient to
warrant a "necessity" instruction, and, in the Second Case, Mr. Beavers failed to make
an offer of proof sufficient to entitle him to present a "necessity" defense (or warrant an
instruction). (Respondent's Brief, pp.16-23, 25-29.) In addition, the State argues that
Mr. Beavers' sentencing arguments have no merit because the district court correctly
interpreted the sentencing enhancement at issue to apply to the Second Case even
though Mr. Beavers was not "convicted" in the First Case until after he allegedly
committed his crimes in the Second Case and, besides, any error was harmless
because the district court probably would have imposed the same sentence even
absent the availability of the enhancement. (Respondent's Brief, pp.30-36.)
The State has cross-appealed on an issue very closely related to the sentencing
issue. In its cross-appeal, the State complains about the fact that, although the district
court found that the sentencing enhancement at issue was available under the relevant
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statute, it did not apply that enhancement because Mr. Beavers' admission to the facts
underlying the enhancement was not knowing, intelligent, and voluntary (because
Mr. Beavers had never been apprised of the possible penalty). The State then argues
that this ruling was tantamount to a sua sponte withdrawal of a plea, such that the State
should have been returned to the status quo ante.

(Respondent's Brief, pp.37-43.)

Alternatively, the State argues that the district court imposed an illegal sentence by
declining to apply the enhancement. (Respondent's Brief, pp.43-35.)
The present brief responds to each of the State's arguments, and is intended to
point out the reasons why each argument fails.
Statement of the Facts and Course of Proceedings
The factual and procedural histories of these cases were previously set forth in
detail in Mr. Beavers' Appellant's Brief. Therefore, they are not reiterated herein.

3

ISSUES
In his Appellant's Brief, Mr. Beavers raised three issues for this Court's
consideration on appeal. Those issues are as follows 1 :
1.

Did the district court err in Mr. Beavers' First Case by refusing to instruct
the jury on the affirmative defense of necessity?

2.

Did the district court err in Mr. Beavers' Second Case by refusing to allow
Mr. Beavers to present evidence in support of his proffered necessity
defense, and by refusing to instruct the jury on that defense?

3.

Did the district court err at Mr. Beaver's joint sentencing hearing by
enhancing Mr. Beavers' sentences in the Second Case based on its
finding that Mr. Beavers had been previously convicted of certain drug
offenses in the First Case?

The State has cross-appealed. Thus, the State has identified a fourth issue for
this Court's consideration. It states that issue as follows:
4.

"Did ihe district court err when, after withdrawing Beavers' admission to a
sentencing enhancement, it failed to reinstate the parties to the status quo
prior to the admission having been made?"2

1

The State has chosen to "rephrase the issues" on appeal in an apparent attempt to
make its issue statement argumentative. (See Respondent's Brief, p.9.) Nevertheless,
the issues on appeal are still the same issues originally identified and argued in
Mr. Beavers' Appellant's Brief.
2
Respondent's Brief, p.9.
4

ARGUMENT
I.
In Mr. Beavers' First Case, The District Court Erred In Failing To Instruct The Jury On
The Affirmative Defense Of Necessity
A.

Introduction
Mr. Beavers contends that the district court erred in the First Case when it denied

his request that the jury be instructed that, even if it found that Mr. Beavers possessed
marijuana, it could find him not guilty on the basis of the common law defense of
necessity based on the fact that his use of marijuana was necessary to treat his medical
condition. (Appellant's Brief, pp.21-28.) In making this argument, he asserts that he
met his burden of production as to the four elements of the defense by offering evidence
that: (1) he faced a specific threat of immediate harm, i.e., a debilitating gastrointestinal
condition; (2) his gastrointestinal condition was not a product of his own doing; (3) he
could not have obtained relief from his gastrointestinal condition by means other than
the use of marijuana; and (4) the harm caused by using marijuana, if any, was not
disproportionate to the suffering avoided. (Appellant's Brief, pp.24-28.)
In response, the State argues that, as a matter of law, the necessity defense is
inapplicable to any of the offenses charged in the First Case (trafficking in marijuana
and possession of marijuana with intent to deliver). (Respondent's Brief, pp.10, 11-15.)
Alternatively, it argues that, even if the necessity defense is a theoretically possibility,
the district court did not err because Mr. Beavers failed to offer trial evidence sufficient
to warrant a necessity instruction. (Respondent's Brief, pp.16-23.)
For the reasons set forth more fully below, neither of the State's present
arguments have merit.

5

B.

The Necessity Defense Is Applicable To The Offense Of Trafficking In Marijuana,
At Least As It Was Charged In The First Case
The State offers two reasons why it believes the necessity defense was barred

as a matter of law in the First Case: first, necessity is only a defense to the crime of
possession of a controlled substance, not trafficking or possession with intent to deliver
(Respondent's Brief, pp.11-13); second, marijuana can never be medically necessary in
Idaho (Respondent's Brief, pp.13-15).

Taking these arguments in reverse order,

Mr. Beavers explains below why neither has merit and why, in fact, the necessity
defense was available in the First Case.

1.

The Necessity Defense Is Applicable To Offenses Involving Marijuana

The State argues (for the first time on appeal) that marijuana can never be
medically necessary.

(Respondent's Brief, pp.13-15.)

The State reasons that since

marijuana was designated a Schedule I controlled substance when the Uniform
Controlled Substances Act (hereinaffer, UCSA) was adopted in 1971, and since the
UCSA provides that in order for the board of pharmacy to subsequently add any drug to
Schedule I, it would have to find (among other things) that that drug has no accepted
medical use, the Idaho Legislature has already determined that marijuana has no
medical benefits and, therefore, marijuana can never be medically necessary as a
matter of law. (Respondent's Brief, pp.13-15.) The State also finds it significant that
marijuana's designation has never been changed by the board of pharmacy.
(Respondent's Brief, p.14 & n.4, p.5.) However, the State's arguments are misplaced.
First, and foremost, the State has misstated the criteria for placing a drug in
Schedule I.

The Idaho Code provides that "[t]he board [of pharmacy] shall place a

substance in schedule I if it finds that the substance: (a) [h]as high potential for abuse;

6

and (b) [h]as no accepted medical use in treatment in the United States or lacks

accepted safety for use in treatment under medical supervision."

I.C. § 37-2704

(emphasis added). Thus, the fact that marijuana is classified as a Schedule I controlled
substance does not necessarily indicate that any finding has ever been made-whether
it have been by the Idaho Legislature or the board of pharmacy-that marijuana has no
accepted medical use; it may very well be that marijuana was designated a Schedule I
controlled substance because it has been determined to "lack[ ] accepted safety for use
in treatment under medical supervision." I.C. § 37-2704(b).
Notably, because it uses of the disjunctive "or" in articulating the criteria for
adding substances to Schedule I, Idaho's Controlled Substances Act differs from the
federal controlled substances law, which uses the conjunctive "and" in defining
Schedule I controlled substances. Under federal law, a substance can only be added to
Schedule I upon findings that the substance "has a high potential for abuse," "has no
currently accepted medical use in treatment in the United States," and lacks "accepted
safety for use of the drug or other substance under medical supervision."

21

U.S.C. § 812(b)(1); United States v. Oakland Cannabis Buyers' Cooperative, 532 U.S.
483, 492 (2001). And, indeed, this is a critical distinction since, in Oakland Cannabis

Buyers' Cooperative, the conclusion that federal law necessarily requires a finding that
the substance in question-in that case marijuana-has no accepted medical use, was
critical to the high Court's conclusion that no medical necessity defense is available to a

7

defendant prosecuted under federal law. Oakland Cannabis Buyers' Cooperative, 432
U.S. at 491-94. 3
Second, the State simply assumes that the same criteria required to be used by
the board of pharmacy in adding substances to Schedule I, i.e., those set forth in
/.C. § 37-2704, were applied when the original version of Schedule I was adopted in
1971; however, the State has offered no support for this proposition and it appears to be
nothing more than speculation.
Third, the State incorrectly implies that the board of pharmacy has an affirmative
duty to continually update Idaho's schedules of controlled substances based on cutting
edge advancements in the field of medicine. However, although the board of pharmacy
is required to "revise and republish the schedules" of controlled substances annually,
I.C. § 37-2714, this does not mean that the board of pharmacy continually re-evaluates
the designation of every substance listed in one of Idaho's six schedules. Indeed, the
USCA provides that the board of pharmacy "may add substances to or delete or
reschedule" the substances listed in Idaho's six schedules of controlled substances.
I.C. § 37-2702(a). Accordingly, it may very well be that, even assuming there were no
accepted medical uses for marijuana in 1971, there are now, nearly forty years later. 4

3

There is an open question as to whether the federal courts can recognize and apply
the common law defense of necessity. See Oakland Cannabis Buyers' Cooperative,
532 U.S. at 490. Accordingly, even if the federal controlled substances statute was not
critically different from the Idaho statute, the cases may still have been distinguishable.
See I.C. § 73-116 ("The common law of England, so far as it is not repugnant to, or
inconsistent with, the constitution or laws of the United States, in all cases not provided
for in these compiled laws, is the rule of decision in all the courts of this state.").
4
As the State points out elsewhere in Respondent's Brief (pp.20-21 ), numerous States
now have medical marijuana laws. Thus, it appears that marijuana does, in fact, have
some medical use in treatment in the United States.
8

Finally, in arguing that marijuana can never be medically necessary simply
because it is listed as a Schedule I controlled substance, the State simply ignores the
Idaho Supreme Court's decision in State v. Hastings, 118 Idaho 854, 801 P.2d 563
(1990), where the Court explicitly held that the necessity defense can be invoked in
cases involving marijuana. 5 Surely, when the Court decided Hastings in 1990, it was
fully aware of the fact that marijuana was a Schedule I controlled substance.

2.

The Necessity Defense Is Applicable To The Offense Of Trafficking, At
Least As It Was Charged In The First Case

Insofar as it does recognize the existence of the Hastings decision (and the fact
that, in that case, the Idaho Supreme Court explicitly recognized that the necessity
defense may be invoked in cases involving the medicinal use of marijuana), the State
argues that, as a matter of law, the holding of Hastings must be limited to the facts of
that case; specifically, it contends that the necessity offense, while it may be applicable
to the charge of marijuana possession, does not extend to the crimes of trafficking in
marijuana and possession of marijuana with the intent to deliver. (Respondent's Brief,
pp.11-13.) The State bases this argument on the Idaho Court of Appeals' Opinion in
State v. Tadlock, 136 Idaho 413, 34 P.3d 1096 (Ct. App. 2001). (Respondent's Brief,
p.13.)
In Tadlock, the Court of Appeals declined to decide whether the defendant,
charged with, and found guilty of, possession of marijuana with intent to deliver, had
met her burden of establishing a prima facie defense of medical necessity.

5

Tadlock,

As controlling precedent, Hastings can only be overturned by the Supreme Court upon
a finding that its holding is manifestly wrong, it has proven to be unjust or unwise, or that
such overruling is necessary to vindicate plain, obvious principles of law and remedy
continued injustice. State v. Watts, 142 Idaho 230,232, 127 P.3d 133, 135 (2005).
9

136 Idaho at 415, 34 P.3d at 1098. It declined to decide this issue on the basis that any
error would have been harmless because the jury found that the defendant had
possessed the intent to deliver and, therefore, "[t]he defense [could] not logically apply .
" Id.

Based on Tadlock, the State's argument would be infinitely reasonable if
Mr. Beavers had only been found guilty of possession with intent to deliver in the First
Case. However, Mr. Beavers was also charged with, and found guilty of trafficking in
marijuana-based solely on the a/legation that he had possessed a large amount of it.
(See R., pp.66-67 (Information), p.540 Uury instruction on the elements of the trafficking

charge).) Thus, with regard to the trafficking charge-at least as it was alleged in this
case-the necessity defense does logically apply.
With regard to the trafficking charge, the State claims that "necessity is not a
viable justification" because "[t]he legislature has effectively determined that possession
of a large amount of marijuana cannot be for personal use" and "an individual cannot
'need' to possess one pound or more of marijuana." (Respondent's Brief, p.13.) This
argument boils down to a claim that the crime of trafficking calls for proof of an intent to
deliver the drugs in question, but that proof of the quantity of drugs possessed
necessarily proves the intent to deliver those drugs. (See Respondent's Brief, p.13.)
However, the State cites absolutely no authority for this fanciful interpretation of the
UCSA.

(See Respondent's Brief, p.13.)

Moreover, the State's interpretation is

inconsistent with the plain language of the UCSA, which must control given the lack of
ambiguity in the statute. State v. Herrera-Brito, 131 Idaho 383, 386-87, 957 P.2d 1099,
1102-03 (Ct. App. 1998).

It also appears inconsistent with State v. Rogerson, 132

10

Idaho 53, 56, 966 P.3d 53, 56 (Ct. App. 1998), where the Court of Appeals held that
"[t]he Idaho legislature elected not to include an element of delivery or intent to deliver in
the definition of the crime it called 'trafficking' in a controlled substance." Finally, it is
important to note that if the State were correct in its interpretation of the UCSA, the
crime of possession with intent to deliver would be a lesser-included offense of
trafficking, see 8/ockburger v. United States, 284 U.S. 289, 304 (1932) ("[W]here the
same act or transaction constitutes a violation of two distinct statutory provisions, the
test to be applied to determine whether there are two offenses or only one, is whether
each provision requires proof of a fact which the other does not."), and 1\/lr. Beavers'
conviction of both offenses in this case would offend the Double Jeopardy clause of the
Fifth Amendment. Brown v. Ohio, 432 U.S. 161, 168-69 (1977).

C.

Given The Facts Of Mr. Beavers' First Case, The District Court Should Have
Instructed The Jury On The Affirmative Defense Of Necessity
In his Appellant's Brief, Mr. Beavers examined the evidence offered at trial in the

First Case and argued that that evidence was sufficient to support an instruction on the
defense of necessity.

(Appellant's Brief, pp.24-28.)

Specifically, he argued that he

presented prima facie evidence of the four elements of the necessity defense.
(Appellant's Brief, pp.24-28.)
In response, the State discusses much of the same evidence and asserts that
Mr. Beavers failed to present sufficient evidence as to two of the four elements of the
necessity defense. (Respondent's Brief, pp.16-22.) In particular, the State claims that
Mr. Beavers failed to present sufficient evidence of a specific threat of immediate harm
(Respondent's Brief, pp.16-18), and that he failed to present evidence showing that his
health problems could not have been treated through a less offensive alternative, i.e.,
11

conventional medicine (Respondent's Brief, pp.18-22).

Interestingly, the State also

argues that there is a fifth element which is implied in the necessity defense-a
causation element-and that Mr. Beavers failed to offer sufficient evidence as to that
element as well. (Respondent's Brief, pp.22-23.)
For the reasons set forth in detail below, the State's present arguments are
without merit.
1.

Mr. Beavers Presented Evidence Of A Specific Threat Of Immediate
Harm, i.e., A Debilitating Gastrointestinal Condition

In his Appellant's Brief, Mr. Beavers argued that, at trial, he presented evidence
of a specific threat of immediate harm by testifying as to the details of the debilitating
gastrointestinal condition from which he suffered.

(Appellant's Brief, pp.24-25.)

In

response, the State asserts that Mr. Beavers "failed to show 'immediacy"' of harm
because his testimony indicated that, once he began using marijuana to treat his illness,
his condition actually improved and became manageable. (Respondent's Brief, pp.1618.)

The State's theory, apparently, is that once Mr. Beavers' condition began to

improve, he was required to have stopped using marijuana and become gravely ill again
and, only at that time, could he resume his use of marijuana under a necessity defense.
(Respondent's Brief, pp.16-18.) Such an argument, however, is patently absurd. When
a hiker trespasses upon someone else's cabin in the wilderness in order to avoid dying
from exposure during a storm, is he required to warm himself quickly, then go out into
the storm again until he becomes hypothermic, and only then return to the cabin?
Under the State's argument, he would. However, a much more rational interpretation of
the necessity defense is that, as long as the storm rages outside, the interloper may

12

remain. Likewise, as long as Mr. Beavers' condition existed, he was justified in using
marijuana to manage the symptoms.
2.

Mr. Beavers Presented Evidence Indicating That He Did Not Bring About
The Harm (The Debilitating Gastrointestinal Condition) Necessitating His
Illegal Act, i.e., His Possession And Use Of Marijuana

Since the State does not contest Mr. Beavers' assertion that he presented
adequate evidence that he did not bring about the harm (his debilitating gastrointestinal
condition) necessitating his marijuana possession and use, no further discussion of that
element of the necessity defense is required.
3.

Mr. Beavers Presented Evidence Showing That The Same Objective, i.e.,
Treatment Of His Health Condition, Could Not Have Been Accomplished
By A Less Offensive Alternative, e.g., Traditional Medicine, That Was
Actually Available, i.e., Affordable, To Him

At trial, Mr. Beavers presented evidence that the same objective achieved
through his use of marijuana, i.e., treatment of his health condition, could not have been
accomplished by a less offensive alternative, such as conventional medicine, that was
actually available, i.e., affordable, to him. This testimony, he argued in his Appellant's
Brief, was prima facie evidence of the third element of the necessity defense.
(Appellant's Brief, pp.26-28.)
In response, the State's primary argument is that Mr. Beavers' testimony in this
regard is not "reasonable" because he failed to explain, to the State's satisfaction, why
he needed to possess such a large quantity of marijuana. (Respondent's Brief, pp.1922.) This argument, however, is without merit.
First, the State's argument is logically flawed. The quantity of marijuana at issue
is wholly irrelevant to the question of whether Mr. Beavers had a medical need to use
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marijuana generally; it goes only to the weight of his testimony, which should have been
a question for the jury.
Second, even if the quantity of marijuana at issue was probative of Mr. Beavers'
medical need for marijuana, other states' medical marijuana laws are not the slightest
bit relevant to the determination of whether the quantity at issue in this case was a
personal use amount or something else.

After all, in a state where there is explicit

statutory authorization for the purchase, possession, and use (for medicinal purposes)
of marijuana, marijuana would be easier to obtain than it is in Idaho and, therefore,
there would be no need to stock up.

Since Mr. Beavers was growing his own

marijuana, he would have needed to plan months, and even seasons, in advance for his
medicinal needs. Indeed, Mr. Beavers testified that, with regard to the herbs grown in
his outdoor garden, he had to grow as much as he could in the summertime and
process whatever he did not use during the growing season for long-term storage.
(Tr. Vol. I, p.823, L.15 - p.824, L.12.) Thus, it is reasonable to infer that this same
approach held true for marijuana. (See Tr. Vol. I, p.826, Ls.6-9 (Mr. Beavers testifying
that he did not grow marijuana in his outdoor greenhouses in winter).)
Third, to the extent that the quantity of marjjuana could be probative of
Mr. Beavers' medical need for marijuana, the State is incorrect when it claims that
Mr. Beavers never explained why he needed so much marijuana. 6 Mr. Beavers testified
that in using marijuana medicinally, he had to "use it throughout the day" and that his

6

With regard to the quantity of marijuana at issue, one must remember that, although
Mr. Beavers was originally charged with possessing 25 pounds or more of marijuana
(R., pp.66-67), he was acquitted of that charge and found guilty of the lesser charge of
possessing between five and 25 pounds of marijuana (R., pp.562-64).
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use was actually greater than it would have been had he been using it recreationally.
(Tr. Vol. I, p.800, Ls.4-11, p.854, L.13-p.855, L.2.) He also testified that, in addition to
smoking marijuana, he began integrating it into his diet. (Tr. Vol. I, p.800, L.13 - p.801,
L.12, p.805, L.5 - p.807, L.6, p.807, L.24 - p.809, L.11, p.811, Ls.5-14, p.812, L.22 p.813, L.1.) Presumably, this would have required far greater quantities of marijuana
than smoking.

Moreover, as the State points out (Respondent's Brief, p.19),

Mr. Beavers testified that he purchased land in Washington and was planning to move
there (Tr. Vol. I, p.817, Ls.7-15, p.819, Ls.18-20, p.824, Ls.13-22), and that this planned
move affected the amount of marijuana he was growing. (Tr. Vol. I, p.824, Ls.13-22,
p.826, Ls.6-19.)

Obviously, Mr. Beavers would have had to have had an adequate

supply of marijuana to cover his medical needs during the time period of the move itself,
and for however long it would have taken him to grow a new crop of marijuana plants
once he got settled in Washington.

In fact, Mr. Beavers testified that by the time his

marijuana was seized in the present case, he had a sufficient quantity of marijuana leaf
material to cover his move to Washington; however, he did not have a sufficient quantity
of bud material, and he needed both leaf and bud material to alleviate his symptoms.
(Tr. Vol. I, p.826, Ls.6-19.)

4.

Mr. Beavers Presented Evidence Supporting The Conclusion That The
Harm Caused, i.e., Commission Of A "Victimless" Crime Of Morality, Was
Not Disproportionate To The Harm Avoided, i.e., Mr. Beavers' Continued
Suffering And Incapacitation

Since the State does not contest Mr. Beavers' assertion that he presented
adequate evidence that the harm caused by his possession and use of marijuana was
not disproportionate to the harm he was suffering because of his gastrointestinal
condition, no further discussion of that element of the necessity defense is required.
15

5.

There Is No Requirement That The Defendant Prove A "Causal
Connection Between the Unlawful Conduct And The Harm Averted"

Although the State acknowledges that in Hastings the Idaho Supreme Court
identified four elements to the necessity defense, the State goes on to argue that there
is actually a fifth element to the necessity defense-causation-which Mr. Beavers
failed to satisfy in this case.

(Respondent's Brief, pp.22-24.)

There are a host of

problems, however, with the State's argument.
First, the State cites two Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals Opinions in support of its
"causal connection" argument; however, those cases identify the elements to the
necessity defense under federal law, and those elements are slightly different than the
elements of the necessity defense under Idaho law. See United States v. Schoon, 971
F.2d 193, 195 (9th Cir. 1991); United States v. Dorrell, 758 F.2d 427, 430-31 (9th Cir.
1985). 7 Mr. Beavers submits the elements of the necessity defense under Idaho law
are best stated in the Idaho Supreme Court's decision in Hastings.
Second, the Ninth Circuit cases cited by the State do not even stand for the
proposition now asserted by the State.

Neither Schoon, nor Dorrell, requires the

defendant to come forward with "causation" evidence demonstrating that his conduct
actually averted some harm; those cases merely require him to show that he

7

In Idaho, the four elements to the necessity defense are: (1) a specific threat of
immediate harm; (2) the threat of harm was not brought about by the defendant's own
action; (3) there are no less offensive alternatives to illegal action; and (4) the harm
caused by the illegal action is not disproportionate to the harm avoided. Hastings, 118
Idaho at 855, 801 P.3d at 564. In the federal courts, the four elements to the necessity
defense are: (1) the defendant chose the lesser of two evils; (2) the defendant acted to
prevent imminent harm; (3) the defendant reasonably anticipated a direct causal
relationship between his conduct and the harm to be averted; and (4) the defendant had
no legal alternatives to violating the law. Schoon, 971 F.2d at 195; Dorrell, 758 F.2d at
430-31.
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"reasonably anticipated" that his actions would avert the harm in question. Schoon, 971
F.2d at 195; Dorrell, 758 F.2d at430-31.
Third, the State's argument is illogical.

There is no principled reason why a

defendant ought to be required to prove that his otherwise illegal actions, which he is
seeking to justify based on necessity, turned out to be successful in the end. By such
reasoning, the criminality of the actions of the lost hiker seeking temporary refuge in
another's cabin during a blizzard would turn not on the reasonableness of his actions
under the circumstances, but only on the ultimate success of his efforts.

Thus, if

despite his best, most reasonable efforts, the lost hiker still suffered frostbite or other
permanent injury, under the State's theory, he would still be criminally liable. This would
be an absurd result. Thus, Mr. Beavers submits that if anything is to be read into the
Hastings test, it would be the requirement only that the otherwise illegal action taken

have been calculated (or reasonably calculated) to avoid the harm in question.
Finally, even if there is some additional causation element to the necessity
defense, the fact is that Mr. Beavers satisfied his burden with regard to that element.
Mr. Beavers testified that the marijuana helped him significantly, allowing him to go from
a point where he "virtually couldn't work" to where he "felt that [he] was doing a
reasonably good job managing" his illness. (Tr. Vol. I, p.854, L.13 - p.855, L.5.) In
addition, he testified that after he was arrested and stopped using marijuana, his
condition worsened again. (Tr. Vol. I, p.827, Ls.2-8.)
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11.
The District Court Erred In Mr. Beavers' Second Case By Refusing To Allow
Mr. Beavers To Present Evidence In Support Of His Proffered Necessity Defense, And
By Refusing To Instruct The Jury On That Defense

A.

Introduction
Mr. Beavers contends that the district court erred in the Second Case when it

precluded him from presenting any evidence in support of a necessity defense.
(Appellant's Brief, pp.28-35.) As with his argument with regard to the First Case, he
asserts that he met his burden of production as to the four elements of the defense by
offering evidence, through his offer of proof, that: (1) he faced a specific threat of
immediate harm, i.e., a debilitating gastrointestinal condition; (2) his gastrointestinal
condition was not a product of his own doing; (3) he could not have obtained relief from
his gastrointestinal condition by means other than the use of marijuana; and (4) the
harm caused by using marijuana, if any, was not disproportionate to the suffering
avoided. (Appellant's Brief, pp.28-35.)
In response, the State argues that the district court did not err because
Mr. Beavers' offer of proof was insufficient to allow him to present his defense.
(Respondent's Brief, pp.24-29.) The State also asserts that, for the same reasons the
necessity defense was unavailable as a matter of law in the First Case, it was also
unavailable in the Second Case. (Respondent's Brief, p.29.)
For the reasons discussed in detail below, the State's arguments are without
merit.
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B.

The Necessity Defense Is Applicable To The Offense Of Trafficking In Marijuana,
At Least As It Was Charged In The Second Case
Incorporating, by reference, its arguments with regard to the unavailability of the

necessity defense as a matter of law in the First Case, the State also asserts that the
necessity defense was unavailable to Mr. Beavers in the Second Case. (Respondent's
Brief, p.29.)

However, for the reasons discussed in Part l(B), above, the State's

arguments are without merit and, in fact, the necessity defense is available for
marijuana-related offenses, and it is available to defendants charged with trafficking, at
least as Mr. Beavers was charged with trafficking in the Second Case.
C.

Given The Facts Of Mr. Beavers' Second Case, The District Court Should Have
Allowed Mr. Beavers To Present Evidence Relating To The Affirmative Defense
Of Necessity, And It Should Have Instructed The Jury About That Defense
In his Appellant's Brief, Mr. Beavers examined the evidence revealed through his

offer of proof in the Second Case and argued that that evidence established a prima
facie defense of necessity, such that he should have been allowed to have presented it
to the jury. (Appellant's Brief, pp.30-35.)
In response, the State discusses some of the same evidence, asserts that
Mr. Beavers failed to present prima facie evidence as to two of the four elements of the
necessity defense, and on that basis argues that the district court correctly precluded
Mr. Beavers from presenting any evidence in support of a necessity defense.
(Respondent's Brief, pp.25-29.) In particular, the State claims that Mr. Beavers failed to
present sufficient evidence of a specific threat of immediate harm (Respondent's Brief,
pp.25-26), and that he failed to present evidence showing that his health problems
could not have been treated through a less offensive alternative, i.e., conventional
medicine (Respondent's Brief, pp.26-29).

The State also argues that there is a fifth
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element which is implied in the necessity defense-a causation element-and that
Mr. Beavers failed to offer sufficient evidence as to that element as well. (Respondent's
Brief, p.29.)
For the reasons set forth in detail below, the State's present arguments are
without merit.
1.

Mr. Beavers Presented Evidence Of A Specific Threat Of Immediate
Harm, i.e .• A Debilitating Gastrointestinal Condition

The State contends that, although Mr. Beavers testified extensively regarding his
serious, chronic health conditions, his offer of proof failed to rise to the level of prima
facie evidence of a threat of immediate harm because: (1) he could have sought

conventional medical treatments for his health problems (Respondent's Brief, pp.25-26);
(2) his condition was not a "true emergency" (Respondent's Brief, p.26).

Neither of

these arguments, however, has merit.
First, to the extent that the State seeks to argue about whether Mr. Beavers
could have sought conventional treatments for his conditions is not relevant to the
question of whether there was a specific threat of immediate harm; those arguments are
best directed at the State's claim that Mr. Beavers' offer of proof failed to satisfy his
burden of production with regard to the third element of the necessity defense-whether
the same objective could not have been accomplished by a less offensive alternative.
Second, the State's "true emergency" argument is woefully misplaced, as it
suggests that only acute medical crises can satisfy the first element of the necessity
test.

However, there is nothing in Hastings which would support such a contention.

Rather, Hastings very clearly indicates that the necessity defense is just as viable for
sufferers of chronic diseases as it is for sufferers of acute attacks.
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See generally

Hastings, 118 Idaho 854, 801 P.2d 563 (holding that the necessity defense was
available to a marijuana user who suffered from rheumatoid arthritis and who suffered
pain and muscle spasms associated with that disease).

2.

Mr. Beavers Presented Evidence Indicating That He Did Not Bring About
The Harm (The Debilitating Gastrointestinal Condition) Necessitating His
Illegal Act, i.e., His Possession And Use Of Marijuana

Since the State does not contest Mr. Beavers' assertion that he presented
adequate evidence that he did not bring about the harm (his debilitating gastrointestinal
condition) necessitating his marijuana possession and use, no further discussion of that
element of the necessity defense is required.
3.

Mr. Beavers Presented Evidence Showing That The Same Objective, i.e.,
Treatment Of His Health Problems, Could Not Have Been Accomplished
By A Less Offensive Alternative, e.g., Traditional Medicine, That Was
Actually Available, i.e., Affordable, To Him

In his offer of proof, Mr. Beavers presented evidence that the same objective
achieved through his use of marijuana, i.e., treatment of his health conditions, could not
have been accomplished by a less offensive alternative, such as conventional medicine,
that was actually available, i.e., affordable, to him. This testimony, he argued in his
Appellant's Brief, was prima facie evidence of the third element of the necessity
defense. (Appellant's Brief, pp.32-34.)
In response, the State offers two arguments: first, the State claims that,
Mr. Beavers' testimony notwithstanding, the evidence shows that he could afford to
seek conventional medical treatment for his conditions; second, the amount of
marUuana at issue proves that Mr. Beavers was not using marijuana for medicinal
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purposes.

(Respondent's Brief, pp.26-29; see also Respondent's Brief, pp.25-26.)

These arguments, however, are without merit.
With regard to its claim that Mr. Beavers could afford conventional medical
treatment for his health conditions, the State points out that, at some point, Mr. Beavers
did go to the emergency room for treatment of a kidney stone and that at one point he
also sought conventional treatment for his irritable bowel syndrome.

The State also

points out that, during the time period that he was using marijuana medicinally,
Mr. Beavers was able to keep his home and buy a few items.

Thus, the State

concludes, Mr. Beavers could afford medical treatment for his various ailments. This
argument, however, is directly contradicted by the evidence. Mr. Beavers testified that
he did not have medical insurance and had to pay out-of-pocket for any medical care
that he obtained. (Tr. Vol. VI, p.81, Ls.7-14.) Further, he testified that, at one point, he
sought conventional treatments (Tr. Vol. VI, p.83, Ls.1-9), he saw numerous doctors in
the process, running up medical bills he could scarcely afford (Tr. Vol. VI, p.68, Ls.5-20,
p.81, Ls.15-22), and he eventually had to stop going to the doctor because he could no
longer afford the necessary care (Tr. Vol. VI, p.82, Ls.19-23; see also Tr. Vol. VI, p.84,
Ls.21-23 (testifying that he could not afford to see specialists)). Thus, at this stage, the
State's argument seems to be that Mr. Beavers was correctly denied an opportunity to
defend himself simply because the State planned to counter the evidence he intended
to offer; however, as discussed in Mr. Beavers' Appellant's Brief, this is not the standard
for determining whether the defendant is allowed to present his defense to the jury. The
standard is whether his offer of proof established a prima facie case and, in this case, it
did.
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With regard to the State's argument concerning the quantity of marijuana at
issue, as discussed in Part l(C)(3), above, that argument is logically flawed because,
among other things, the quantity of marijuana at issue is wholly irrelevant to the
question of whether Mr. Beavers had a medical need to use marijuana generally.

4.

Mr. Beavers Presented Evidence Supporting The Conclusion That The
Harm Caused, i.e., Commission Of A "Victimless" Crime Of Morality, Was
Not Disproportionate To The Harm Avoided, i.e., Mr. Beavers' Continued
Suffering And Incapacitation

Since the State does not contest Mr. Beavers' assertion that he presented
adequate evidence that the harm caused by his possession and use of marijuana was
not disproportionate to the harm he was suffering because of his gastrointestinal
condition, no further discussion of that element of the necessity defense is required.
5.

There Is No Requirement That The Defendant Prove A "Causal
Connection Between the Unlawful Conduct And The Harm Averted"

Incorporating, by reference, its arguments with regard to an implied causation
element in the necessity defense insofar as that defense was applicable in the First
Case, the State also asserts that Mr. Beavers failed to present prima facie evidence of
causation in the Second Case. (Respondent's Brief, p.29.) However, for the reasons
discussed in Part l(C)(5), above, there is no causation element to the necessity defense
and, even if there were, Mr. Beavers presented prima facie evidence of causation in his
offer of proof in the Second Case.
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111.
The District Court Erred At Mr. Beaver's Joint Sentencing Hearing By Enhancing
Mr. Beavers' Sentences In The Second Case Based On Its Finding That He Had Been
Previously Convicted Of Certain Drug Offenses In The First Case
A.

Introduction
Mr. Beavers contends that the district court erred at his joint sentencing hearing

when it ruled that his sentences in the Second Case could be enhanced based on his
"prior convictions" in the First Case.

(Appellant's Brief, pp.35-40.) This argument is

based on his contention that the enhancement statutes at issue (I.C. §§ 37-2739, 2739A, and -2732(B)(a)(7)), all of which are based on the existence of prior convictions
for drug offenses, require the prior conviction to predate commission of the subsequent
offense. (Appellant's Brief, pp.36-40.)
In response, the State offers two arguments.

First, the State asserts that the

enhancement statutes require only that the prior conviction predate conviction of the
subsequent offense and, therefore, the district court correctly determined that the
enhancements apply in this case. (Respondent's Brief, pp.31-34.) Second, the State
argues in the alternative that any error was harmless anyway because the district court
only actually applied one of the three enhancements and, with regard to the one
enhancement actually applied, the State thinks the district court would have inevitably
imposed the same sentence even absent the enhancement.

(Respondent's Brief,

pp.30, 34-36.) For the reasons set forth below, neither of these arguments has merit.
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B.

Mr. Beavers' Sentences In The Second Case Could Not Be Enhanced Based On
His Prior Convictions In The First Case Because Those Prior Convictions Did Not
Exist At The Time That He Allegedly Committed The Offenses At Issue In The
Second Case
In his Appellant's Brief (pp.37-40), Mr. Beavers analogized the sentencing

enhancements at issue in this case to another statutory sentencing enhancement aimed
at punishing recidivism-Idaho's persistent violator statute, I.C. § 19-2514-and argued
that the enhancements in this case ought to be similarly limited to situations in which the
defendant's prior conviction pre-dated his commission of his subsequent offense.
Mr. Beavers reasoned that such an interpretation of the enhancements (which is
consistent with the majority rule in the United States), is logical because such statutes
are intended to impose a harsher punishment on the defendant who, after having been
previously convicted (and typically punished) for his first drug crime and, thus, given a
strong warning, failed to learn his lesson and reform his behavior. (Appellant's Brief,
pp.38-40.)
In response, the State concedes that the precise issue before the Court in this
case is one of first impression. (Respondent's Brief, p.31.) Nevertheless, it offers of
host of arguments in favor of a more expansive application of the sentencing
enhancements at issue, and it asserts that, given its more expansive interpretation, the
district court did not err in ruling that the enhancements could be applied to Mr. Beavers'
Second Case.

(Respondent's Brief, pp.31-34.)

Ultimately, however, none of these

arguments are persuasive.
First, focusing on the one sentencing enhancement that was actually applied in
this case, the State argues that Mr. Beavers' "argument is contrary to the plain language
of the statute, which demands no specific sequence, but only requires a prior trafficking
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conviction .... " (Respondent's Brief, p.31.) This assertion is internally inconsistent
though.

Because the enhancement provided for in section 37-2732B(a)(7) (and,

indeed, all of the enhancements at issue in this case) requires a "prior" conviction, that
statute does demand a specific sequence.
The State has (mis)characterized section 37-2732B(a)(7) as "demand[ing] no
specific sequence" because it wants to take advantage of the holding of State v. Craig,
117 Idaho 983, 793 P.2d 215 (1990). (See Respondent's Brief, pp.31-32.) In Craig, the
Idaho Supreme Court held that the statute elevating a third DUI offense to a felony (if
they occurred within five years), I.C. § 18-8005(3), did not require the first two
convictions to precede commission of the third offense.

Craig, 117 Idaho at 984-85,

793 P.2d at 216-17. However, the Craig holding turned on the fact that the statute at
issue spoke in terms of "three (3) or more violations" and, therefore, did not require any
specific sequence of offenses. Id.
In contrast to the DUI statute at issue in Craig, the enhancements at issue in this
case most certainly do require a specific sequence. Section 37-2739 speaks in terms of
being "convicted of a second or subsequent offense"; section 37-2739A speaks in terms
of someone "who has previously been convicted"; and section 37-2732(B)(a)(7) speaks
in terms of "[a] second conviction." Accordingly, the State's characterization of those
enhancements as not requiring a specific sequence is misplaced, Craig is inapplicable,
and the State's "plain language" argument is devoid of merit.
Second, the State asserts that this Court cannot give effect to the Legislature's
intent in enacting the sentencing enhancements at issue in this case (and give those
enhancements a narrow interpretation) because it claims that the plain language of the
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enhancements

clearly

supports

its

broad

reading

of

those

enhancements.

(Respondent's Brief, p.33.) However, as noted immediately above, the plain language
of the sentencing enhancements does not clearly demand the broad application that the
State now urges. Rather, the language of those enhancements all require a specific
sequence of events, i.e., a conviction prior to the offense at issue, but all fail to specify
what the conviction has to be prior to (whether it be commission of the subsequent
offense, a finding of guilt of the subsequent offense, or some other event). Accordingly,
there is nothing improper about this Court seeking to effectuate the Idaho Legislature's
intent in interpreting the enhancements at issue. Cf. State v. Brandt, 110 Idaho 341,
343-44, 715 P.2d 1011, 1013-14 (Ct. App. 1986) (discussing, and attempting to give
effect to, the legislative intent behind Idaho's persistent violator statute where that
statute used language consistent with that which is used in the enhancements at issue
in this case). Nor would there be anything improper about this Court invoking the rule of
lenity and construing the statutes in a manner that is most favorable to the defendant.
State v. Herrera-Brito, 131 Idaho 383, 386-87, 957 P .2d 1099, 1102-03 (Ct. App. 1998).

Third, the State attempts to deflect Mr. Beavers' analogy to Idaho's persistent
violator statute by pointing out that, in certain of the "persistent violator" cases, it was
said that convictions entered the same day, or charged in the same information, may
not always count as a single offense for purposes of evaluating the defendant's status
as a persistent violator.

(Respondent's Brief, pp.33-34.)

However, the State's

arguments in this regard are so far afield from any issue that is actually before this
Mr. Beavers has not analogized the

Court as to be completely irrelevant.

enhancements at issue in this case to the persistent violator statute in an effort to argue

27

that his convictions in the First Case and the Second Case are somehow one and the
same; his point is simply that the persistent violator statute has been interpreted as an
attempt to punish recidivists for failing to learn the lessons attendant to their prior
convictions and that this legislative intent can only be furthered where the prior
conviction preceded the commission of the subsequent offense.
Finally, the State asserts that even if Mr. Beavers was not convicted in the First
Case prior to commission of the offenses charged in the Second Case, the legislative
objective of punishing recidivism is still furthered by application of the sentencing
enhancements in the Second Case because, by the time Mr. Beavers allegedly
committed his offenses in that case, he was on notice of the wrongfulness of his
conduct because he had already been arrested and charged in the First Case.
(Respondent's Brief, p.34.) However, the fact is that Mr. Beavers believed he had a
viable necessity defense in the First Case; thus, at the time of the alleged commission
of the offenses in the Second Case it was not at all clear that his prior conduct had been
wrongful in the First Case. Moreover, the State's focus on notice is misplaced. After all,
we presume that everyone knows what the law is (so long as that law is reasonably
clear). See Sprague v. City of Burley, 109 Idaho 656, 667-68, 710 P.2d 566, 577-78
(1985).

The question with recidivism statutes is whether the defendant has actually

suffered a conviction and, typically, a sentence, and thus, has had impressed upon him
the gravity of his actions and then had been given an opportunity to reform his conduct.
Certainly, that did not happen in this case.
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C.

The District Court's Error Was Not Harmless
The State's alternative argument is that, even if the district court did err in ruling

that the charged enhancements could be applied in this case, that error was harmless
because only one of the three enhancements was actually applied and, with regard to
that enhancement, the State thinks the district court would have imposed the same
sentence even absent the enhancement.

(Respondent's Brief, pp.34-36.)

This

argument is misplaced.
Initially, even though the district court did not apply the enhancement set forth in
section 37-2739A, the district court's error in finding that sentencing enhancement
potentially available was not harmless because the State has cross-appealed the district
court's decision not apply that enhancement to the Second Case and, therefore, there is
a possibility that Mr. Beavers' case will be remanded for a new sentencing hearing
wherein that enhancement could be applied. 8

(See Respondent's Brief, pp.37-45.)

Moreover, the enhancement set forth in section 37-2732B(a)(7), which doubles the
mandatory minimum fixed sentence for trafficking offenses when the defendant has
previously been convicted of trafficking, was applied in this case.
More importantly, the State has no basis to speculate that, even absent the
enhancement set forth in section 37-2732B(a)(7), Mr. Beavers surely would have
received the sentence of twelve years, with two years fixed on the trafficking count in
the Second Case. (See Respondent's Brief, pp.35-36.)

8

By pointing out that Mr. Beavers' case could be remanded based on the State's crossappeal, Mr. Beavers is not conceding error in the district court's decision not to apply
the sentencing enhancement contained within I.C. § 37-2739A.
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IV.

The District Court Did Not Err In Declining To Apply The Sentence Enhancement At
Issue
A.

Introduction
After ruling that the three sentence enhancements discussed in Part 111 of

Mr. Beavers' Appellant's Brief (pp.35-40) and Part Ill of this Appellant's Reply/ CrossRespondent's Brief (pp.23-29) were available for use in sentencing Mr. Beavers in the
Second Case, the district court ultimately decided not to apply the enhancement
provided for in I.C. § 37-2739A. (See Tr. Vol. I, p.1068, L.12 - p.1072, L.1, p.1072,
Ls.16-23.)

That enhancement, had it been applied, would have required at least a

three-year sentence, consecutive to Mr. Beavers' other sentences, for his delivery
conviction in the Second Case (based on his trafficking conviction in the First Case),
and it would have allowed for a sentence up to fixed life on that particular count.
I.C. § 37-2739A. 9

However, the district court concluded that since there was no

evidence that Mr. Beavers had ever been informed of this potential penalty, his
conditional admission to the fact of his "prior" trafficking conviction could not stand as a
knowing, intelligent, and voluntary waiver of his right to trial on that issue. (Tr. Vol. I,
p.1069, L.5 - p.1072, L.1; see also R., pp.707, 711-13 (district court's subsequent

9

Contrary to the State's claims (see Respondent's Brief, pp., 37, 44), nothing in section
37-2739A requires that the three-year minimum sentence be ordered to be fixed.
Compare I.C. § 37-2739A (making no mention of the words "fixed" or "determinate")
with I.C. § 37-27398 (providing for the "fixed" minimum sentences in drug cases). Thus,
should this Court determine that this case must be remanded for re-sentencing so that
the district court might apply the minimum sentence provided for under section
37-2739A, Mr. Beavers reserves his right to argue that that minimum sentence may be
imposed as a wholly indeterminate sentence.
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explanation of its decision).)

Further, the district court reasoned that the sentence

ultimately imposed on the delivery count-a concurrent sentence of five years, with two
years fixed-appropriately satisfied Idaho's sentencing objectives (Tr. Vol. I, p.1068,
Ls.12-19; see also R., pp.707, 708 (district court's subsequent explanation of its
decision).)
Following Mr. Beavers' sentencing hearing and entry of the district court's
judgment of conviction, the State filed a motion, pursuant to Idaho Criminal Rule 35, to
correct what the State believes is an illegal sentence. (R., pp. 693-96.) The State's
argument at that time was that the district court had no authority to not apply the
section 37-2739A enhancement to Mr. Beavers' delivery conviction in the Second Case.
(R., pp.694-96.)

The district court, however, denied the State's motion on the basis

that, without a knowing, intelligent, and voluntary waiver of the right to a jury trial on the
facts underlying the enhancement, the district court simply could not apply that
enhancement to the Second Case.

(R., pp.707, 711-13.)

The district court further

explained that the sentence ultimately imposed satisfied the applicable sentencing
objectives (R., pp.707, 708) and made it clear that, had it been strictly required to apply
the enhancement, it would have structured Mr. Beavers' sentences in such a way as to
achieve the same aggregate sentence (R., pp.711, 714).
The State now cross-appeals. (See generally Respondent's Brief, pp.37-45.) In
its appeal, the State takes the position that the district court effectively withdrew
Mr. Beavers' guilty plea on the enhancement without returning the parties to the status
quo ante, and that it effectuated a de facto dismissal of the sentencing enhancement
through "its refusal to apply that enhancement and its refusal to allow the state to
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proceed on its charge." (Respondent's Brief, pp.37-41.) Thus, the State prays for a
remand of Mr. Beavers' case so that the State may prove the facts underlying the
enhancement at trial. (See Respondent's Brief, pp.37-43.) The State also argues that
the district court abused its discretion by failing to "apply the enhancement because it
had met the goals of sentencing without regard to the enhancement," and it asks that,
upon remand for a trial on the enhancement, the district court be ordered to apply the
enhancement.

(Respondent's Brief, pp.41-43.)

Finally, the State contends that,

regardless of whether Mr. Beavers' plea to the enhancement was knowing, intelligent,
and voluntary, the district court had no choice but to apply the enhancement.
(Respondent's Brief, pp.43-45.)
The State's contentions are without merit. First, the State, as the appellant on
this particular issue, cannot be heard to complain about the district court's decision to
withdraw Mr. Beavers' "plea" to the enhancement without setting the matter for a new
trial and allowing the State to prove the facts underlying the enhancement, where the
State never made that argument below.

Second, the district court did not err in

safeguarding Mr. Beavers' due process rights by declining to apply a sentence
enhancement which Mr. Beavers did not knowingly, intelligently, and voluntarily plead
guilty to.

Third, to the extent that any error did occur in the district court's

unconventional handling of this issue, that error was harmless.

B.

The State's Primary Argument On Appeal-That It Should Have Been Returned
To The Status Quo Ante Following The Withdrawal Of Mr. Beavers' "Guilty Plea"
To The Enhancements-ls Not Properly Before This Court Because It Was
Never Raised Below
Prior to Mr. Beavers' joint sentencing hearing, the State filed a sentencing

memorandum implicitly asserting that Mr. Beavers' convictions in the First Case could
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be used to support the sentencing enhancements charged in the Second Case, and
also offering the State's interpretation of how the enhancements should work with the
base sentences involved in Mr. Beavers' cases.

(R., pp.661-66.) At the sentencing

hearing itself, the State reiterated these arguments. (Tr. Vol. I, p.1014, L.4 - p.1020,
L.22.)

Ultimately, when the district court announced its intent not to impose the

enhancement provided for by I.C. § 37-2739A (based on its recognition that
Mr. Beavers had not knowingly, intelligently, and voluntarily waived his right to trial on
the fact underlying the charged enhancement), the State protested and hinted at its
intent to appeal the district court's decision in that regard. (See Tr. Vol. I, p.1073, L.17 p.1075, L.16.)

Later, the State even filed a motion to correct an allegedly illegal

sentence, arguing that the district court had no choice but to impose the enhancement
provided for in section 37-2739A. (R., pp.693-96.) At no point, however, did the State
ever object on the basis that the enhancement had been "effectively dismissed" such
that the State was deprived of its chance to prove the facts underlying that
enhancement, and at no point did the State move the district court for a trial on the
enhancement. (See generally Tr. Vol. I, p.1068, L.12 - p.1076, L.6; R., pp.693-96.)
It is now well-established under Idaho law that an appellant cannot be heard to
complain on appeal about matters that were never raised in, or decided by, the district
court. State v. Ouva/t, 131 Idaho 550, 553, 961 P.2d 641, 644 (1998). In this case,
since the State (the appellant as to this limited issued) presents an argument
concerning the denial of its opportunity to prove the enhancement in question which
was never raised in, or passed upon by, the district court, that issue is not properly
before this Court.
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C.

The District Court Was Correct Not To Have Applied The Enhancement In
Question Where It Knew That Mr. Beavers' "Guilty Plea" To That Enhancement
Was Not Knowingly, Intelligently, And Voluntarily Entered
The State argues, apparently in the alternative, that even if it is not entitled to a

remand of Mr. Beavers' case for an opportunity to prove the enhancement at issue at
trial, this Court should conclude that the district court imposed an illegal sentence and it
should remand Mr. Beavers' case for a new sentencing hearing wherein the
enhancement may be applied, despite the fact that Mr. Beavers' plea was not

knowingly, intelligently, and voluntarily given.

(See Respondent's Brief, pp.43-45.)

Thus, the State apparently would have had the district court actively participate in a
violation of Mr. Beavers' Fourteenth Amendment right to due process of law.

See

Boykin v. Alabama, 395 U.S. 238, 243 n.5 (1969) (holding that a guilty plea must be
knowingly and voluntarily given in order to comport with the Fourteenth Amendment's
requirement of due process).

However, Mr. Beavers submits that the prudent and

correct course of action for the district court in this case was to safeguard his due
process rights by refusing to impose a sentencing enhancement for which he had not
entered a valid plea.

After all, the Fourteenth Amendment's due process clause is

supreme and, therefore, where it conflicts with the application of a sentencing statute,
must control over the statute. See U.S. CONST. art. VI, cl.2. 10 Accordingly, the district

10

The Supremacy Clause states as follows:
This Constitution, and the Laws of the United States which shall be made
in Pursuance thereof; and all Treaties made, or which shall be made,
under the Authority of the United States, shall be the supreme Law of the
Land; and the Judges in every State shall be bound thereby, any Thing in
the Constitution or Laws of any State to the Contrary notwithstanding.

U.S. CONST. art. VI, cl.2.
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court did not err in failing to apply the sentencing enhancement provided for in section
37-2739A.

D.

Even If The District Court Erred In Declining To Apply The Sentencing
Enhancement At Issue In Mr. Beavers' Second Case, That Error Was Harmless
Idaho Criminal Rule 52 provides that "[a]ny error, defect, irregularity or variance

which does not affect substantial rights shall be disregarded." Mr. Beavers submits that
any error in failing to apply the sentencing enhancement provided for in section 372739A which was based on the conclusion that Mr. Beavers' "plea" to the enhancement
was not knowingly, intelligently, and voluntarily entered, would fall into this category of
harmless error. The State, therefore, is not entitled to any relief on appeal.
1.

The Sentencing Enhancement Provided For In I.C. § 37-2739A Does Not
Apply To This Case Because The Convictions In The First Case Were Not
"Previous" Convictions Within The Meaning Of That Enhancement
Provision

For the reasons stated more fully in Part Ill of Mr. Beavers' Appellant's Brief
(pp.35-40) and Part Ill of this Appellant's Reply Brief/ Cross-Respondent's Brief (pp.2329), and hereby incorporated herein by this reference, Mr. Beavers contends that the
sentencing enhancement for "previous[ ]" convictions for "felony offenses of dealing,
selling or trafficking in controlled substances" (I.C. § 37-2739A) cannot apply in this
case, where the "previous[]" conviction (in the First Case) came about after commission
of the subsequent offense (in the Second Case). As a consequence, any error on the
district court's part in failing to apply that enhancement against Mr. Beavers in the
Second Case, based on the belief that Mr. Beavers' "plea" to that enhancement was not
knowingly, intelligently, and vol.untarily entered, was harmless.
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2.

Even If It Had Applied The Sentencing Enhancement At Issue, The
Record Demonstrates That The District Court Would Have Imposed The
Same Aggregate Sentence That Was Ultimately Imposed

At Mr. Beavers' consolidated sentencing hearing, the district court made it clear
that the appropriate aggregate prison sentence for Mr. Beavers' crimes is, in its view,
that which was ultimately imposed-twelve years, with three years fixed.
p.1065, L.9 - p.1068, l.10.)

(Tr. Vol. I,

The only question, therefore, is how the district court

intended to arrive at that aggregate sentence. Although the State now complains about
how the district court did so (in declining to utilize the enhancement provided for in
section 37-2739A), the fact is that the district court made it clear that if it were forced to
apply the sentencing enhancement at issue, it still would have structured Mr. Beavers'
sentences in such a way as to arrive at the aggregate sentence ultimately imposed in
this case-twelve years, with three years fixed.
L.6; R., pp.709-11, 714.)

11

(See Tr. Vol. I, p.1073, L.23 - p.1076,

In light of this fact, any error on the district court's part in

failing to apply the enhancement against Mr. Beavers in the Second Case, based on the

11

The district court read section 37-2739A as requiring a fixed minimum sentence (see,
e.g., R., pp.706-07)-a conclusion with which Mr. Beavers disagrees. (See note 9,
supra.) Under Mr. Beavers' reading of section 37-2739A the district court could have
simply imposed fully indeterminate sentences in the Second Case to have achieved the
same aggregate sentence of twelve years, with three years fixed.
On the other hand, the district court also read section 37-2739A as requiring only
that the sentence imposed for delivery in the Second Case run consecutively to the
other sentences in the Second Case, not the sentences in the First Case. (See
R., pp.709-11, 714.) This is a conclusion with which Mr. Beavers agrees. Accordingly,
he contends that an alternative avenue of achieving the same aggregate sentence was,
as the district court pointed out, to impose a three-year fixed sentence on the delivery
conviction, consecutive to fully indeterminate sentences on the other convictions in the
Second Case, and concurrently with all of the sentences in the First Case.
36

belief that Mr. Beavers' "plea" to that enhancement was not knowingly, intelligently, and
voluntarily entered, was harmless. 12
CONCLUSION
For the reasons set forth above, as well as in his Appellant's Brief, Mr. Beavers
respectfully requests that this Court vacate his convictions and remand both of his
cases for new trials, wherein he will be allowed to present his necessity defense and
have the respective juries instructed on the defense of necessity.

In the alternative,

Mr. Beavers requests that his sentences be vacated and his cases remanded for a new
sentencing hearing.

12

Mr. Beavers is not unmindful of the fact that his harmless error argument in this
section is in direct conflict with part of his argument in Part lll(C}, above (arguing against
the State's harmless error argument). Obviously, Mr. Beavers cannot hope to prevail in
both instances; he merely prays that, whatever this Court's conclusion with respect to
the parties' harmless error arguments, it is applied consistently as to both parties.
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